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The welfare effect of input price discrimination has been 
intensively studied for the last two decades. In this paper, we 
apply the analysis of input price discrimination to the problem 
of environmental regulation. We assume that firms compete 
in quantities in a downstream market. These firms use both 
clean and dirty inputs in their productions. The clean inputs 
are supplied by an upstream monopolist that may price 
discriminate against the downstream firms. The use of the 
dirty inputs causes environmental pollution and the 
government levies a pollution tax on the pollution emission. 
We show that the upstream monopolist charges the 
environmentally friendly firm a higher price than it does the 
environmentally unfriendly firm. We demonstrate that such 
input price discrimination increases pollution emissions, 
lowers the effectiveness of pollution taxation, and undermines 
social welfare. We argue that the government can enhance 
social welfare by implementing a tax-subsidy policy mix. 
Keywords: Input Price Discrimination, Environmental Regulation, Emission Tax, 
Input Subsidy. 
1 Introduction 
Many manufacturing firms purchase intermediate inputs from upstream 
firms and use them in their production activities. In some cases, the 
upstream firm possesses a monopoly power and attempts to charge 
the downstream manufacturing firms different prices. The consequence 
of such third-degree price discrimination has been an important policy 
issue in many countries. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act in・the 
U.S. forbids any person or firm engaged in commerce to price 
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discriminate against different purchasers of the same commodity. 
In academia, the welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination 
has been intensively studied in the last century. The early literature 
dealt with third-degree price discrimination in the final goods market.1 
The recent literature, however, focuses on third-degree price 
discrimination in the input market. Katz {1987) and DeGraba (1990) 
presented a framework of input price discrimination. In their model, an 
upstream monopolist sells an intermediate input to downstream duopoly 
firms. These downstream firms have different production technologies 
and have different input demands. Therefore, the upstream monopolist 
has an incentive to discriminate against the downstream firms with 
regard to input price. Katz and DeGraba demonstrate that input price 
discrimination by the upstream monopolist always lowers social welfare 
because it shifts production from the efficient firm to the inefficient 
firm. 
If social welfare is directly related to output level, then welfare 
evaluation will be simplified. For this reason, most of the literature 
dealing with price discrimination has studied the relationship between 
output and social welfare.2 In this paper, we employ the standard model 
of input price discrimination and address an economic problem that 
has not yet been studied in the previous literature: the problem of 
environmental regulation. 
In the environmental economics literature, it is well known that the 
optimal environmental regulation in a monopoly market is looser than 
that in a perfectly competitive market. The monopolist restricts its output 
below the socially desirable level. Therefore, the optimal pollution tax 
should be less than that in a perfectly competitive market.3 However, 
except for the analysis of optimal taxation, litle research has been 
conducted on the relationship between monopoly and environmental 
regulation. In particular, hardly any research is available with regard to 
the effect of antitrust policies on environmental regulation. In this paper, 
we study a typical antitrust policy {the Robinson-Patman Act) and 
1 See Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), and Schwartz (190) for the reference. 
2 Yoshida (200) and Valletti (203) generalized the analysis of input price discrimination. Yoshida showed 
that the increase in output becomes the sufficient condition for welfare deterioration. Valleti demonstrated 
that input price discrimination negatively affects both consumer surplus and total welfare under reasonable 
assumptions 
3 Lee (1975) and Barnett (1980) derived such a second-best fee. 
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examine its effect on environmental regulation. 
We will consider vertically related markets in this paper. The 
downstream market comprises Cournot duopoly firms that produce the 
final product for consumers. These downstream firms use two 
intermediate inputs in their production. One is a dirty input that is 
supplied in a competitive market and its use causes environmental 
pollution. The other is a clean input that is supplied by the upstream 
monopolist and its use does not cause any environmental pollution. 
The two downstream firms have different production technologies and 
use the dirty input in different quantities. We refer to the firm that uses 
a lesser amount of the dirty input as an environmentally friendly firm. 
We refer to the other firm as an environmentally unfriendly firm. The 
difference in these firms'production technologies provides the upstream 
monopolist with an incentive to price discriminate against them. 
In order to mitigate the pollution problem, the government levies an 
emission tax on pollution emission. It further provides a subsidy for the 
purchase of the clean input. 
We examine the effects of input price discrimination in the above 
framework. Specifically, we examine how output, pollution emission, 
consumer welfare, and social welfare are affected by input price 
discriminatio記 Weshow that input price discrimination increases the 
total pollution emission, lowers consumer welfare, and undermines 
social welfare. We further show that the effectiveness of emission 
taxation is reduced by input price discrimination. Therefore, input price 
discrimination not only increases pollution emission but also lowers the 
effectiveness of pollution taxation. 
In the real world, governments often support the purchase of clean 
inputs that ease environmental pollution. We examine whether the 
subsidy for the clean input improves social welfare. Specifically, we 
propose a policy mix of emission tax and input subsidy that maintains 
a targeted level of aggregate pollution emission. We show that such a 
policy mix shifts production from the inefficient firm to the efficient firm 
and increases social welfare. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
4 To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that analyzed the effect of input price discrimination on 
environmental regulation. 
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basic model. We show that the upstream monopolist charges the 
environmentally friendly firm a higher price than it does the 
environmentally unfriendly firm. In Section 3, we examine the effects of 
input price discrimination on the environmental condition and consumer 
welfare. We show that input price discrimination by the upstream 
monopolist increases the total pollution emission and lowers consumer 
welfare. In Section 4, we examine the effect of input price discrimination 
on social welfare. We show that social welfare is reduced by input price 
discrimination. In Section 5, we evaluate the effectiveness of pollution 
taxation. We show that the effectiveness of pollution taxation will be 
reduced by input price discrimination. In Section 6, we examine whether 
a tax-subsidy policy mix increases social welfare. We demonstrate that 
a policy mix that maintains the pollution level improves social welfare. 
In Section 7, we generalize the analysis. We conclude the paper in 
Section 8. 
2 The Model 
The downstream market comprises two manufacturing firms. These 
firms produce a homogeneous final product and compete in quantities. 
Let qi and佑 denotethe quantities of the final product produced by firm 
i and firm j , respectively. The aggregate supply of the final product is 
indicated by Q三尺 Qi_5 
We assume that the downstream firms produce their products using 
two varieties of inputs: a clean input and a dirty input. The clean input 
is supplied by the upstream monopolist M, while the dirty input is 
supplied in a competitive market. The upstream monopolist M produces 
the clean input at a constant marginal cost cM. The production of the 
clean input requires a special production technology, which may be 
patent protected. 
We assume that the downstream firms have Leontief-type 
technologies. The downstream firm i requires one unit of the clean 
input and /Ji units of the dirty input to produce one unit of the final 
product.6 Let ei denote the amount of pollution emission by firm i・壽One
5 In order to avoid a clutter, the summations are expressed in a simple manner, for example, どXi,which 
should be considered as叩十 Xか
6 The Leontief-technology assumption implies that the downstream firms cannot reduce pollution emission 
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unit of the dirty input leads to one unit of pollution emission. Hence, 
when producing one unit of the final product, firm i generates功 units
of pollutants, i.e., ei = (3ふ.In this simple framework, the intensity of the 
dirty input used determines the pollution intensity measured by ed qi . 7
For later reference, we define the degree of heterogeneity between 
the two downstream firms'pollution intensities by n/3三功／功.Throughout 
this paper, we assume that n/3 :; 1. Thus, firm i uses a lesser amount 
of the dirty input as compared with firm j to produce one unit production 
of the final product. Using casual expressions, we refer to firm i and 
firm j as environmentally friendly and environmentally unfriendly firms, 
respectively. 
Let p denote the price of the final product. The consumer's 
preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear, U = u (Q) + m, where m is 
the consumption of the numeraire good.8 From consumer's utility 
maximization, the downstream firms face the inverse demand function 
of the form, p = u'(Q)三 p(Q).
In order to mitigate the pollution problem, the government imposes 
an emission tax at the rate of T. At the same time, the government 
provides a subsidy to the downstream firms when they purchase the 
clean input. For simplification, we normalize the price of the dirty input 
to 1. The profit function of the downstream firm i is given by 
1fi = [p(Q) -(1 -a) Ti 店ー]Qi - Teぃ (1) 
where ri is the price of the intermediate input andび isthe ad valorem 
rate of the input subsidy月
The upstream monopolist M earns the following profits: 
by exchanging dirty inputs for clean inputs. 
7 In standard production theory, the capital intensity in sector i is defined as k; 三 K;/L; , which is the capital-
labor ratio. In the present model, the intensity of the dirty input is /3; = /Ji/1 since the clean input requirement 
is 1. So, 比＜約 impliesthe difference in the downstream firms'production technologies. On the other hand, 
the pollution intensity is defined as ed qi , which is equals to /Ji . Hence, 比＜功 canbe considered as 
representing the heterogeneity in the pollution intensities of the two firms. 
8 The utility level is assumed to be additively separable from the disutility arising from environmental 
damage 
, We assume that the government returns its pollution tax revenue according to the following condition: 
びこ⑳ く心e;. Ifwe regard T as the market price of the emission permit, the following model can be 
applied to the analysis of a transferable permit. 
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7rM三（巧ー C叫 qi+ (T j -CM) qj・ (2) 
The game between the upstream monopolist and the downstream 
manufacturing firms proceeds as follows, 
- Stage 0: The government sets the emission tax rate T and the 
subsidy rateび・
- Stage 1: The upstream monopolist M sets a discriminatory price 
pair {rわり undera discriminatory pricing regime, or sets 
a uniform input price r三乃＝乃 ifprice discrimination is 
not allowed. 
- Stage 2: The downstream manufacturing firms decide their output 
levels (qいlj).
In order to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage 
game, the usual backward induction is employed. Thus, we begin with 
solving the stage-two problem. 
2.1 Downstream Market 
To solve the model explicitly, we suppose that the inverse demand 
function facing the downstream firms is linear: 
p(Q)三 a-bQ, a,b > 0. (3) 
As in the previous literature, we assume Cournot competition in the 
downstream market. The first-order condition for profit maximization is 
枷 i
- = a-bQ-bqiー (1-a-) ri -(1 + r)店=0.
8qi (4) 
Substituting this result into (1), the second-stage Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium downstream profit is expressed as 1ri = bq;. Hence, the 
downstream profit increases with the downstream output expansion. 
Solving the reaction functions implicitly defined in (4) yields the 
second-stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium output: 
qi = -[ a -2 ((1 — a-) 八十 (1+ T) {Ji) + ((1ー a-)r'j + (1+ T)/3j)]. (5) 
3b 
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2.2 Upstream Market 
We now find a solution to the stage-one problem. M maximizes (2) 
subject to (5). In the case of input price discrimination, the choice 
variables are ri and rj. Thus, the first-order condition for the input price 
discrimination is 
枷 M 1 
街 i = -[2 (a -CM -2 (1ー u)八ー (1+ ,)出）ー (a-CM - 2 (1ー u)乃一 (1+,)約）] =0, 3b 
from which we obtain the optimal discriminatory pricing rule 
a + (1-a) c M -(1 + r) /3i 
ri = (6) 
2 (1-a) 
According to the pricing rule in (6), the downstream firm that requires 
more dirty inputs is charged a lower input price. In other words, the 
environmentally unfriendly firm is charged a lower input price. 
In our model, the difference in the use of dirty inputs by the two 
downstream firms causes price discrimination. To examine this, consider 
the degree of price discrimination: 
nr= _ = a+ (Iー a)c」M - (I+ r) Pi 
rj a+ (I —ぴ）国— (1 + r)功 ~1. 
(7) 
When the two firms are identical, 店＝約； thus, nr = 1. Therefore, the 
upstream monopolist has no incentive to price discriminate. As long as 
店くも， 8釘／如>o and 叩 r/缶>o hold.10 Thus, the degree of price 
discrimination increases with both the subsidy and the tax rate. In other 
words, the monopolist strengthens the degree of price discrimination 
as the government strengthens environmental regulation. We now 
summarize the above findings. 
Lemma 1 Suppose that two downstream firms use dirty inputs in 
different intensities. Then, under a discriminatory pricing regime, the 
environmentally friendly firm is charged a higher input price than the 
environmentally unfriendly firm. The degree of the input price 
discrimination rises when the government increases the emission tax. 
10 By differentiation,. we have犀伽=CM (1 +T) (B-8 2 1 , i)/(a+ (1-a)cM -(1 +T)も） > o and 
[)f!T /8T =(a+ (l -a) CM) (功ー /3;)/(a+ (l -a)cM -(1 +T)功）2> o.
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It also rises when the government increases the subsidy rate. 
If price discrimination is not allowed, the monopolist M is constrained 
by ri = rj三 r.Therefore, the first-order condition for profit maximization 
by charging a uniform price is 
d7fM 1 = "' 
dr 
[2 (a+ (1 -a) CM -2 (1 —a) r) -(1 + T) (Pi十功）] = 0.
3b 
Solving this yields the optimal uniform pricing rule: 
r= (a+(lーぴ）CM -(1 +T)万），
2 (1ーぴ）
(8) 
where f3 = (比＋約）/2 is the average of the two firms'polluting rates. 
From (6), we can further show that the optimal uniform price coincides 
with the average of the discriminatory prices, i.e., r = r三（八十Tj)/2. 
3. Effects of Input Price Discrimination 
3.1 Effect on Output 
Since we have derived the first-stage optimal input pricing rules, we 
now obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium outputs. Under the 
discriminatory pricing regime, the downstream equilibrium output is 
given by 
qf =喜 (a-(1-o-) 国— (1+ 7) (2功一功））． (9) 
Hereafter, the superscript d denotes the discriminatory pricing scheme, 
while the superscript u denotes for the uniform pricing scheme. 
Expressions without these superscripts can be applied to both the 
pricing schemes. Under our assumption that /3i~ 約 wehave qiミ%-
This result implies that the environmentally friendly firm produces more 
output than the environmentally unfriendly firm despite facing a higher 
input price under the discriminatory pricing regime. This is because the 
ranking of the overall-costs between the two firms is not reversed by 
price discrimination i.e c. 三 ・• , i (1 -O') r i + (1 + T) /3i < C j二 (1-ぴ）乃+(1 + 7) 
均
・Using expression (5), we can denote the equilibrium output of firm i 
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by佑＝ 面(a-2cf + cj). By summing the two firms'equilibrium outputs, 
the total output under the discriminatory pricing regime becomes 
2 
Qd = qf + qj = -a —ぎ），
3b （ ．?
????? ? ??
? ??? ? (10) 
On the other hand, the equilibrium individual output under the 
uniform pricing regime is given by 
吋＝喜 (a-(l-a)国+(1 + T) 万ー 2(1+T)(狐—功））． (11) 
Under our assumption that Pi :; /3j, we obtain q『2q1J . Hence, as in the 
discriminatory pricing regime, the environmentally friendly firm produces 
more output than the environmentally unfriendly firm. 
Let c『三 (l-r7)r ( + l+T功 and cj三 (1-ぴ）r + (1 + r) /3j denote the 
downstream firms'marginal costs under the uniform pricing regime. 
The individual equilibrium output under the uniform pricing regime is 
d expresse as q-= -(a-・ 
i 3b 
2c'I!- u + cj). By aggregating the equilibrium 
individual outputs, the total output under the uniform pricing regime 
becomes 
2 Qu =吋十q'1J= -(aー守），
3b 
c'I! + c~ -u i 
C 三 J 2 . (12) 
Noting thatぎ＝（1ー (J')ア+(l+T)B=， (1 -O') r + (1+ T){3 = c , we obtain Q = Q尺
Hence, the total output remains unaffected by the pricing regime.11 
For later reference, we define the difference in firm i's equilibrium 
outputs under the two pricing regimes as follows: 
l+T 
△ qi 三 qf —吋＝ （出一功） < 0. 4b (13) 
From the result that Qd = Qu, we can further show that△ qj = qf-q7J 
= -(qi ― qd 三—△qi > o.We now summarize the above findings. 
Lemma 2 A regime change from uniform pricing to discriminatory 
pricing decreases the output of the environmentally friendly firm and 
11 This result depends on the Leontief-technology assumption with regard to the downstream firms as well as 
on the linearity assumption with regard to the inverse demand function. See Yoshida (2000) and Valletti 
(2003) for the detailed discussion. 
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increases that of the environmentally unfriendly firm. Specifically, the 
output levels are ranked as qf > qf > qf > q1J. However, the total output is 
unaffected by the regime change. 
3.2 Effect on Emission 
In this subsection, we analyze the effect of price discrimination on total 
pollution emission. Under the uniform pricing regime, the total emission 
becomes 
炉＝叶十ej=/3閲+/3jqj" (14) 
By substituting qf = qf +丼 andqf = q1J +△ qJ 炉 △ Qi the total em1ss1on 
under the discriminatory pricing regime becomes 
Ed = ef + ej= (Pi~ ば十f31q1J)+ (f3i -/31)△ qi・ (15) 
By replacing the first term on the right-hand side of (15) by E叫 wecan 
show that 
△ E=Ed-炉＝（瓜ー内）△qi・ (16) 
We showed that△ qi< o in (13). Hence, △ E ;: o isguaranteed because 
/3i :; 防 isassumed. This result implies that input price discrimination 
increases total pollution emission. 
When the upstream monopolist is allowed to price discriminate, it 
charges the environmentally friendly firm a higher price than it does 
environmentally unfriendly firm. Such price discrimination shifts 
production from the environmentally friendly firm to the environmentally 
unfriendly firm. This production shift results in increasing the total 
pollution emission, holding the total output constant. 
Proposition 1 If downstream firms have heterogeneous pollution 
intensities, then the total pollution emission under the discriminatory 
pricing regime is greater than that under the uniform pricing regime. 
3.3 Effect on Consumer Welfare 
In the previous subsection, we showed that input price discrimination 
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increases the total pollution emission. Therefore, input price 
discrimination increases environmental damage. Consumer welfare is 
given by consumer surplus minus environmental damage. If the 
consumer surplus under the discriminatory pricing regime is lower than 
that under the. uniform pricing regime, then we can conclude that 
consumer welfare is reduced by・input price discrimination. In this 
subsection, we show that input price discrimination lowers the consumer 
surplus. 
Consumer surplus cs is defined as the net consumer benefit, which 
is the difference between the gross consumption benefit, u (Q), and the 
consumer expenditure to purchase the final products, pQ . Using the 
inverse demand function in (3), we can derive 
CS(Q)三 U(Q) -p(Q) Q =½bQ2. (17) 
Since the aggregate output is the same across the two pricing regimes, 
the difference in the consumer surpluses is zero, △ cs三 CS(Qり
-CS(Q門=o. Therefore, the consumer is indifferent to the two pricing 
regimes. We now establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 2 If consumer welfare is measured by the consumer 
surplus minus environmental damage, then the consumer is adversely 
affected by input price discrimination. 
4. Effect on Social Welfare 
In the previous section, we examined・the effect of input price 
discrimination on consumer welfare. There are three other players in 
our economy: the upstream monopolist and the two downstream 
manufacturing firms. If input price discrimin_ation is allowed, then the 
profit of the upstream monopolist must rise. Input price discrimination 
simply provides an additional production choice to the monopolist. As 
we have seen, the profits of the downstream manufacturing firms are 
related to their output levels. Therefore, if input price discrimination is 
allowed, the profit of the environmentally friendly firm is reduced while 
that of the environmentally unfriendly firm is increased. 
Let D (E) denote the environmental damage to the economy. We 
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assume that D'> o and D"ミo.The social welfare 1s given by 
W 三 u(Q) + m -D (E) Let L be the total labor supply available to the 
economy, and let it be perfectly inelastic. Since the wage rate is unity, 
the wage income is also given by L , which is constant. Therefore, the 
national income after tax is given by Y = L + 7rM + L 1ri. The net tax 
revenue of the government 1s T = どT邸—m況i}. We assume that the 
remaining tax revenue is returned to the consumers in a lump sum 
manner. Then, the budget constraint for a representative consumer is 
given by pQ+m=Y+T=L+区 (p- 国—瓜）qi. Solving this for m yields 
m=L —L (/Ji+ CM屈.The social welfare is given by 
W=u(Q)+L —L (f3i + CM) Qi -D (E) . (18) 
The difference in the social welfare between the two pricing regimes 
is 
△ W=△ u-L(功＋叫△qi —• D, (19) 
where△ u=u(Qり— u(Q門 and △D 三 D(Eり— D(E門.Since the aggregate 
output i~unaffected by the regime change, △ u = o.Applying 号＝—△qi 
, we can express (19) as 
△ w = -(/Ji —内）△qi —• D. (19') 
The first term in (19') is negative since△ qi< o and f3i < /3i. Although the 
aggregate output is unchanged, the price discrimination shifts production 
to the inefficient firm. Such a shift is costly for the economy (production 
inefficiency). From炉>Eu and D'> 0, △ D > o is guaranteed. Hence, 
the input price discrimination leads to more environmental damage 
(environmental inefficiency). Due to these two inefficiencies, we obtain 
△ W<O-
Proposition 3 When two downstream firms play a Cournot game, 
input price discrimination generates both production and environmental 
inefficiencies. Due to these inefficiencies, social welfare declines. 
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5. Effect on the Effectiveness of Pollution Taxation 
5.1 Output Change Caused by Emission Tax Increase 
An emission tax increase leads to a reduction of the final product. We 
compare the degree of the output reduction caused by the emission tax 
increase between the two pricing regimes. 
Under the discriminatory pricing regime, the output change of the 
environmentally friendly firm is given by 
帽 1
缶 6b- -(功ー 2瓜） ~o ⇔功 ~2/3か
In other words, if the environmentally unfriendly firm uses more than 2.0 
times the quantity of dirty inputs used by the environmentally friendly 
firm, then the former increases its production as a result of the emission 
tax increase. However, by applying the same procedure to firm j's 
output, we can easily show that the environmentally unfriendly firm 
never exhibits a perverse output response to an increase in the emission 
tax rate. 
From (10), we obtain the aggregate output reduction under the 
discriminatory pricing regime: 
祝び 1-
=--/3<0. 
8T 3b 
(20) 
Although there exists the possibility that the environmentally friendly 
firm will increase its output, the output reduction by the environmentally 
unfriendly firm is always greater than the potential output increase by 
the environmentally friendly firm. 
Under the uniform pricing regime, the output change of the 
environmentally friendly firm is given by 
吋 1
缶 12b
― (5功— 7/3i) 多 O ⇔功多 1.4店．
If the environmentally unfriendly firm uses more than 1.4 times the 
quantity of dirty inputs used by the environmentally friendly firm, then 
the former increases its production as a result of the emission tax 
increase. The above analysis reveals that the perverse output response 
to the emission tax increase is more likely to be observed under a 
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uniform pricing regime. Since we showed thatぴ=Qd, we obtain the 
aggregate output reduction result under the uniform pricing regime as 
in (20): 
叩 u 1-
石=-囮/3< 0. 
Proposition 4 Suppose that the government raises the emission tax. 
The environmentally friendly firm expands its output when there is a 
sufficiently large heterogeneity in the pollution intensities. This perverse 
output response is more likely under the uniform pricing regime than 
under the discriminatory one. On the other hand, the environmentally 
unfriendly firm always reduces its output irrespective of the extent of 
heterogeneity in the pollution intensities. Furthermore, aggregate output 
reduction is always observed under both pricing regimes. 
5.2 Effectiveness of Emission Taxation 
We will examine the manner in which the effectiveness of emission 
taxation is affected by the pricing regime. The total pollution emission 
is given by E = f3ゅ +p虹j.Differentiating this total emission with respect 
to T, we have 
8E 8qi 8% - =/3・ 一・OT i OT ＋功一一OT. (21) 
In the previous subsection, we showed that there exists a possibility 
that the environmentally friendly firm i expands its output. If this is the 
case, then firm i's emission level ei rises as a result of the increase in 
the emission tax. However, we can show that the aggregate emission 
E never increases as a result of the increase in the emission tax. 
Furthermore, we can demonstrate that emission taxation becomes less 
effective under the discriminatory pricing regime: 
2 8Ed 8Eu 1 
0 > --/3i/3j―一 (/3i-/3j) = > - = --/3び方—― (/3i -/3j) . 
3b 3b Br Br 3b 12b 
Proposition 5 Input price discrimination lowers the effectiveness of 
pollution taxation. 
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In Section 3, we found that the total emission was higher under the 
discriminatory pricing regime. Hence, input price discrimination not only 
increases the aggregate pollution emission but also lowers the 
effectiveness of pollution taxation. Therefore, input price discrimination 
has an adverse effect on environmental regulation. 
Contrarily, the effects of the clean input subsidy on the outputs are 
uniform across the upstream pricing regimes: 
耀吋 1
＝＝ 加加 6b国>0. 
Hence, the introduction of the input subsidy aggravates the environment 
under both the pricing regimes: 
8Ed 8EU 1 
-= =-(功＋内）国>0. 
加加 6b
Since there is no substitutability between the clean input and the dirty 
input, subsidizing the clean input increases the output as well as the 
demand for the dirty input. This leads to more pollution emissions by 
the downstream firms. 
6. Tax-Subsidy Policy Mix 
We have seen that input price discrimination increases the total pollution 
emission and lowers social welfare. Suppose that the government 
cannot directly prevent input price discrimination. We then examine 
whether it can indirectly resolve the adverse consequence of the input 
price discrimination. Specifically, we examine whether the government 
can improve social welfare by using a tax-subsidy policy mix. 
When the government increases the subsidy rate, both the 
downstream firms increase their outputs. As a consequence of the 
output increase, the level of pollution emission increases. Therefore, in 
order to hold the pollution level constant, the government needs to raise 
the emission tax when itincreases the input subsidy. Assuming that the 
government maintains the total emission level constant, we examine 
whether itcan improve social welfare by using the emission tax and the 
input subsidy simultaneously. 
There exist many tax and subsidy combinations that induce the 
126 
same amount of total pollution emission. Here, we define the slope of 
such an iso-emission curve in the tax-subsidy space, say E (T, a)=刀
By totally differentiating E with respect to T and a, we can derive the 
slope of the iso-emission curve as follows: 
竺=2 (f3i -f31げ＋見）
dT (瓜＋内）CM 
> o. (22) 
It indicates the rate by which the government can increase the input 
subsidy when raising the environmental tax by one unit. 
Using the expression for social welfare in (18), we evaluate the effect 
of the tax-subsidy policy mix. By totally differentiating w along the iso-
emission curve (i.e., dE = o) and using u'= p and E三 I:ei , we express 
the welfare change under the discriminatory pricing regime as 
dWd 
=I:(pー 俎ー C叫一
dqf 
dT . 
dE=O dT dE=O 
Therefore, the welfare change is the sum of the output change weighted 
by the terms p -/Ji -cM, which correspond to the notion of "double 
marginalization" and are positive. From the comparative statics results 
in the previous section and (22), the change in the output is expressed 
as follows: 
暫 ＝約（約一瓜）
dT dE=。2b(出＋約） > 0, 
dqJ 
dT 
=-
店（約ー 店）
dE=O 
2b (出＋内）
< 0. 
The comparative statics results show that firm i expands its output 
when the tax-subsidy policy mix is implemented. On the other hand, 
firm J reduces its output. Using these output changes, the welfare 
change under the discriminatory pricing regime is given by 
dWd (約一/3i)2
dT ldE=O =(p-cM)2b(広＋防） > 0.
Hence, a tax-subsidy policy mix is always welfare improving. 
The present paper assumes that the downstream firms have 
Leontief-type technologies. Therefore, the firms cannot reduce their 
pollution emissions by exchanging the dirty input for the clean input. In 
the above analysis, welfare improvement is achieved by production 
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reallocation. Input price discrimination by the upstream monopolist 
distorts the production allocation of the downstream firms. By 
implementing a tax-subsidy policy mix, the government shifts production 
from the environmentally unfriendly firm to the environmentally friendly 
firm and partially resolves the problem of input price discrimination. 
Proposition 6 Suppose that the government introduces a tax-subsidy 
policy mix holding the aggregate emission level constant. Then, the 
environmentallyfriendlyfirm expands its output while the environmentally 
unfriendly firm reduces its output. The tax-subsidy policy mix partially 
resolves the production inefficiencies caused by the input price 
discrimination and improves social welfare. 
7. Generalization 
7 .1 Nonlinear Demand Curve and an Oligopoly Downstream 
Market 
In this section, we generalize the previous analysis. We consider a 
situation in which there are n Cournot firms in a downstream market. 
These downstream firms are ranked by the degree of their pollution 
emissions, i.e., Pk~/3ぃ for k E {1, ・ ・ ,n -1}. We further relax the 
assumption of the linearity of the demand function. Under these 
conditions, we argue that the weak concavity of the・demand function 
becomes a sufficient condition for pollution increase by input price 
discrimination. 
The following result generalizes Lemma 1: (See Appendix A.1 for 
the proof.) 
Lemma 3 The optimal discriminatory prices possess the property of 
九 2:rぃ forall k E {1, ・ ・ , n -1} . Further, the downstream equilibrium 
outputs under the discriminatory pricing regime are ranked as qt~qt+i 
for al k E {1, ・ ・ , n -1} . 
The firms that use more dirty inputs are charged a lower input price. 
In other words, under the discriminatory pricing regime, environmentally 
friendly firms face higher input prices than environmentally unfriendly 
firms. Although the environmentally friendly firms face higher input 
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prices, the ranking of the overall costs is preserved. Thus, an 
environmentally friendly firm produces more outputs than an 
environmentally unfriendly firm under a discriminatory pricing regime. 
We now compare the aggregate output under the discriminatory 
pricing regime, Qd, with that under the discriminatory pricing regime, 
Qu. Appendix A.3 establishes the following relationship: 
Qd夏Qu⇔ p"ミ0.
Proposition 7 The aggregate equilibrium output under the 
discriminatory pricing regime is larger (smaller) than that under the 
uniform pricing regime if and only if the final product demand is strictly 
convex (concave). When the demand is linear, p" = o,input price 
discrimination has no effect on the aggregate equilibrium output. 
Our next task isto compare firm k's output under the discriminatory 
pricing regime, qt, with that under the uniform pricing regime, q悶.From 
Appendix A.3 , we now generalize Lemma 2 as follows: 
d< Lemma 4 qk > q悶⇔f3k > f3三 (3-2p" (Q) [Hd -1/n] / (1+ T), where 
炉 isthe Herfindahl index under the discriminatory pricing regime. If 
the amount of the dirty input used by firm k to produce one unit of the 
final good is less (more) than the adjusted average of 7J,firm k contracts 
(expands) its output when price discrimination is allowed. 
If the final product demand is weakly convex, then p ミO.The 
adjusted average will be smaller than the average polluting rate, f3さf3.
According to Lemma 4, the downstream firm with the mean polluting 
rate f3k =万 willexpand its production when price discrimination is 
allowed. If the distribution of阪 issymmetric around万， thenthe 
aggregate pollution emission increases as a result of the input price 
discrimination. 
7 .2 Product Differentiation 
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the two final products 
are homogeneous. Here, we consider the situation in which the two 
products are heterogeneous. Suppose that firm i produces final product 
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i, whose price is denoted by Pi. Then, the inverse demand function 
facing firm i takes the following form: 
Pi (qi, qj)三 a-b (qi + 0qj) , a,b > 0, (3') 
where e measures the degree of substitutability between the two final 
products. The value of e ranges between o and 1. A larger value of e 
implies greater substitutability. If the products are homogeneous, then 
e = 1. Applying this inverse demand function, we can derive the same 
pricing rule as equation (6) under the discriminatory pricing regime. 
Similarly, we can derive the same pricing rule as equation (8) under the 
uniform pricing regime. 
The downstream equilibrium output under each pricing regime is 
now given by 
qi = 2b (4 -0り[(2 -0) (a -(1 —ぴ）CM)-(1 +T) (2瓜—凰）， (9')
qf = 2b (4~ —炉） [(2-0) (a-(1-a)凶+(1 + r)豆）ー 2(1 + r) (2体—鱈）]・(11') 
The corresponding total output remains the same between the two 
pricing regimes: 
Qd = Qu = 
b (2+ 0)(a -(1ーぴ）CM -(1 + T)万）．
Hence, as in the homogeneous duopoly case, we obtain 
△ qi= qf -吋=-(qff —吋）＝—△qj. 
By comparing the output levels under the two pricing regimes, we 
can examine the effect of input price discrimination on an individual 
firm's output. For firm j , we have 
△ Qj = qf -qJ = (1+4;~i竺;~~) f3J [ 20: 1 -nf3]・
Hence, 位>o because炉<1 and 1~3/ (20 + 1)~3. As we have seen, 
the total output is unaffected by the pricing regime. Thus, 凶 <0.We 
conclude that firm j always expands its output, while firm i contracts 
its output if the upstream monopolist is allowed to price-discriminate. 
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Applying the analysis in Section 3.2, we can easily show that input 
price discrimination increases the total emission. Thus, we can 
generalize Proposition 1 to the case of product differentiation. 
As in the analysis in Section 5.1, we can show that as a result of the 
emission tax increase, firm i may increase its output, but firm j never 
does so. Under the discriminatory pricing regime, the output responses 
to the emission tax increase are given by 
8qf ゜＝ 8T 2b (4 -02) (0約ー 2瓜） ~0 {=::::}伊之う’
碕
8T 2b(4-02) 
(0瓜— 2功） <0⇔ 炉<-. 
゜
On hand, under the 
responses are given by 
the other uniform pricing 
8q「 1 40 + 1 
- = ((40 + 1)/3j —7,Bi)~0 • n/3~, 
OT 4b(4-02) 7 
aqu J ＝ 
1 
BT 4b (4 -02) 
((40 + 1)凡―7功） <0⇔ 炉＜ . 7 
40+ 1 
regime, the output 
Therefore, firm 
sufficiently large, 
regime. 
increase i may 
but firm 
output if the heterogeneity is 
so irrespective of the pricing 
its 
never does j 
Using these results, we can compare the effectiveness of emission 
taxation between the two pricing regimes. From o :;0 :;1, it follows that 
the aggregate emission is reduced under the both the pricing regimes: 
8Ed 1 戸＝一b(4 —伊） [(2 -0)閏＋（瓜一功）2] < 0, 
8Eu l 7 缶＝ーb(4 —炉） [ (3-20)閏 +4訊ー内）2] < 0, 
Furthermore, the difference in the emission reduction is 
8Ed 8Eu 1 3 
缶― a;-=b(4-伊） [ (1-0)凸 +4仇ー功）2] > 0.
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Therefore, Proposition 5 carries over to the case of product 
differentiation. 
We now examine the effect of input price discrimination on consumer 
welfare. For this purpose, consider the utility function of the form: 
u (qi, qj) = a (qi+ qj) -0.5b(qf + 20q沼1+ qJ). We can demonstrate that the 
following relationship: △ CS<O<△u三 u(qf,qf) -u(qf, q『)＜△ (pQ) = p叱兄
予 Q叫 Therefore,although price discrimination increases the gross 
consumption, △ u > o,it decreases the overall consumer surplus, 
△ cs< o .This is because price discrimination raises the consumer's 
expenditure in purchasing the final product, △ (pQ) > 0 
The logic underlying this result is explained as follows. Due to the 
specification of the gross consumption benefit, the consumer equally 
enjoys the consumption of each differentiated product. Therefore, the 
consumer prefers the equalized consumption bundle. Under the uniform 
pricing regime, the upstream monopolist charges the two downstream 
firms the same price; and thus, the output of the environmentally friendly 
firm is more than that of the environmentally unfriendly firm, qi > qi . If
input price discrimination is allowed, then the upstream monopolist 
raises the input price for the environmentally friendly firm and lowers it 
for the environmentally unfriendly firm. Hence, input price discrimination 
lowers the production of the environmentally friendly firm and raises 
that of the environmentally unfriendly firm. Consequently, the 
consumption bundle is more equalized under the discriminatory pricing 
regime. This equalization effect, caused by input price discrimination, 
leads to an increase in the gross consumption benefit, △ u > o.
However, product differentiation grants the downstream firms more 
market power over their own products. The environmentally friendly 
firm can pass the input price increase to its consumers, by raising the 
selling price of its product. The price increase of the final product raises 
the consumer expenditure, △ (pQ) > o.Thus, the increase in the 
consumer expenditure cancels the gain in the gross consumption 
benefit, △ u<△ (pQ). 
It should be noted that product differentiation may invalidate 
Proposition 3. See equation (19). As we discussed before, the 
equalization effect of the consumption bundle guarantees a rise in the 
gross consumption benefit, △ u > O. The gain from the equalization 
effect may outweigh the production and environmental inefficiencies 
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caused by the input price discrimination. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the effect of input price discrimination on 
environmental regulation. We showed that input price discrimination 
aggravates the environmental condition. When input price discrimination 
is allowed, the upstream monopoly firm charges the environmentally 
friendly. firm a higher price than it does the environmentally unfriendly 
firm. As a result of this input price discrimination, production is shifted 
from the environmentally friendly firm to the environmentally unfriendly 
firm. This production shift results in an increase in the pollution 
emission. 
We further showed. that input price discrimination lowers the 
effectiveness of pollution taxation. Therefore, input price discrimination 
not only increases the pollution emission but also lowers the emission 
tax's effectiveness in reducing pollution. Thus, input price discrimination 
undermines environmental regulation. Laws that forbid price 
discrimination, such as the Robinson-Patman Act, will contribute to 
environmental protection. 
The government may be unable to directly forbid input price 
discrimination. However, it can indirectly resolve the adverse 
consequences of input price discrimination. In this paper, we considered 
a tax-subsidy policy mix that maintains the total emission level. Such a 
policy mix shifts production from the environmentally unfriendly firm to 
the environmentally friendly firm. Through this production reallocation, 
the inefficiency caused by the input price discrimination is partially 
resolved and social welfare is enhanced. 
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Appendix A: Derivations of Downstream Oligopoly Solutions 
A.1 Discriminatory Pricing Regime 
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The profit function of the downstream firm is the same as that given by 
equation (1). The first-order condition that corresponds to equation (4) 
is now given by 
枷［
- = p + p'qf -(1 -a)九一 (1+T虞 =0,
匈K
(Al) 
where p'= dp/ dQ and qt is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output under 
the discriminatory pricing regime. We modify the first-order condition of 
(Al) so that 
九= [P + p'qf -(1 + T) {3月．
1ー び
Therefore, the monopolist now faces n inverse demand functions. 
We now convert the monopolist's problem into one that involves 
maximizing its profit心=Lぃ-CM qk, with respect to (q1, ・ ・ ,qn). 
This is possible because any feasible output combination can be 
induced by the appropriate choice of the discriminatory prices, (rぃ...心）
. Substituting the above inverse demand functions into 1r'fvr and 
differentiating it with respect to qぃwehave the following discriminatory 
pricing rule: 
九＝国— 1~a [p'qf +鱈+p"区(qが］， (A2) 
where Qd三〉又.Using this result and (q% -qい）p'= (1 -a) (rk -rk+I) 
+ (1 + T) (Bk -f3k+1) from (Al), we can derive the results in Lemma 3: 
l+T 
rk-rk+I = (f3k+I -f3り?::0, 
2 (1 -a) 
l+T 
qf-qt+1 = - (f3k+1 -f3k)~0. (A3) 
2p' 
A.2 Uniform Pricing Regime 
Suppose that input price discrimination is prohibited. Then, the first-
order condition for downstream profit maximization under the uniform 
pricing regime is 
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枷[ー=p+ p'q悶ー (1-a) r -(1 + T) f3k = 0, 
8qk 
(A4) 
where qi: is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output under the uniform 
pricing regime. Aggregating the above conditions across n firms and 
dividing it by n, we have the following inverse demand function: 
, Qu 
r~l _ er(v -(1 + r)万+P-:;-), (A5) 
where戸 (Lf3k)I叫
Under the uniform pricing regime, the profit function of the upstream 
monopolist is given by 1r沿三 L(r-cM瓜=(r-叫 Q.After substituting (A5) 
into this profit function of the monopolist, 1r幻becomesa function of Q . 
We differentiate it with respect to Q: 
鱈
— ~[p -(1-び)CM -(1 +r)万＋ n+2 p'Q+p ,,Q2 8Q lー び n 了l. (A6) 
It becomes zero when Q = Q尺 OnceQu is obtained from (A6), the optimal 
uniform price is derived from (A5): 
r = CM - (n + 1 i~: p" Qu (予） • (A7) 
Hence, the individual equilibrium output can be solved from (A4) by 
substituting r andぴ init. 
A.3 Comparison of the Equilibrium Outputs 
Using (A6), we compare Qd with Qu. We first substitute (A2) into (Al) to 
obtain 
ー =p-(1- か）凶— (1+ T虞+2p'q~+ p'Qd + p"区 (q~)2 = 0. (Al') 枷［
8qk 
Aggregating this across n firms and dividing it by n, we have the 
following condition: 
pー (1-a) 国— (1 + T)豆+n : 2 p'Qd + p"区 (q~)2 = o. (A8) 
We know that the output combination (qf, ・ ・ ,q訂 mustsatisfy the 
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condition (AS). Applying (AS) to (A6), we evaluate the slope of the 
profit function of the monopolist at Q =び：
讐 Q~Qd = 1-'jJ'~[区 (qf)2 -(Q22] . (A9) 
Next, using mathematical induction, we show that the sign of the square 
bracket in (A9) is positive; thus, we prove Proposition 7. 
When n = 2,we have (qf)2 + (qが (QゲI2=-
2 
(qf -qが>o. Suppose 
立外）2 -(Qデ/n> o for n = k. Then we have 
g=l 
立:i2-(文q:Y/h>O-ht閲）2 -(文q:)2 > O. (AlO) 
g=l g=l g=l g=l 
We now calculate the case for h + l:
(h+~ 苫閲）2 -(> q:):, h 2 h 
=h;(qゲ+h(喜）2+; 犀 -(;q:) -2q~+I戸
＞（戸り2+ h (q~+l) 2 十〗属）2 -(戸q:)2 -2qt+1戸外
h 
= I: (q~+l -qゲ>0, 
g=l 
where the inequality follows from (AlO). 
Our next task is to compare q~with q悶.At the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium under the discriminatory pricing regime, q~satisfies (Al'); 
thus, it also satisfies (A8). On the other hand, we substitute the optimal 
uniform input price (A 7) into (A4) to have 
枷¢
8qk 
=p-(1ー a-)CM -(1 + T)虚十p'q悶+((n + 1) p'+ p" Q門Qu/n = 0. (A4') 
We now evaluate枷訂如 atqk = q~. Replacing q;: by q~and Qu by Qd 
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in (A4') and then using (A8), we have 
塁仇~q/~(1+ T) (万—叫 /2-p" (Qゲ[L(qt/Qデ—¾],
where qt -Qd/n = (1 + T)(/3 —叫 I(-2p') was used. Let us define the 
Herfindahl・index under the discriminatory pricing regime as 
Hd三区(qVが）2~1/n ⑫ Then 
枷 k - 2p" (Qゲ 1后 q,~q/z 0⇔ j3― l+T [印-; l zfJk・
This leads to Lemma 4. 
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